Politics in Africa are commonly viewed from the top down. Journalists and social scientists alike tend to focus on the deeds-and misdeeds-of African presidents and the coterie that surrounds them. The mixed political history of postcolonial Africa, for example, is often written in terms of the leadership of exceptional individuals like Mandela, Mugabe, and Museveni. And political developments are often summarized with reference to distinctive national institutions like dominant ruling parties or interventionist armed forces. Ordinary people, who initially embraced oneparty and military rule, are conventionally portrayed in the literature on African politics as mere bit players in supporting roles to centralized institutions or influential "big men."
This imbalance in the coverage of elite and mass politics was disrupted when political openings began across sub-Saharan Africa some thirty years after independence. In the 1990s-foreshadowing the Arab Spring of 2011-citizens in many African countries took advantage of the end of superpower support for ailing dictators to demand civil and political rights. Analysts took note by paying greater attention to civic associations, the informal economy, street protest, and the emergence of opposition political parties. Some of these popular initiatives contributed to a groundswell of constitutional and political reforms, to the convocation of multiparty elections, and occasionally even to transitions to fragile or hybrid forms of democracy. The advent of a measure of democratization seemed, for the first time since the struggle for independence, to hold out the promise of a greater measure in African politics of "rule by the people."
But by the first decade of the twenty-first century, political elites had learned to adapt to new expectations. Leaders had little choice but to recognize that political legitimacy required a popular vote in multiparty elections. Thus some African presidents bowed to democratic institutions, for example by peacefully accepting a loss at the ballot box or refraining from running again for office when they encountered term limits. But other leaders chose a different path, which encouraged analysts to return attention to elite behavior and institutional rules. The current literature on African politics features accounts of efforts by political incumbents to manipulate electoral laws, evade formal accountability, employ patronage and violence for political ends, and revive and maintain dominant party institutions. Emblematic of this new form of top-down politics are attempts by long-serving presidents to bypass constitutional restrictions on the number of terms in office that they are allowed to serve.
While acknowledging that political elites and dominant institutions retain the upper hand in African politics, I argue that ordinary people are not powerless. Nor should their political attitudes and behavior be overlooked. By voting in competitive elections, for example, they hold within their purview the power to bestow political legitimacy on-or withhold it from-leaders, institutions, and regimes. And by developing other attributes of democratic citizenship between elections-such as engaging in public events, joining others to address collective problems, and contacting political leaders-individuals can enhance the likelihood of holding leaders accountable.
Purpose
This book draws attention to recent research on voting and democratic citizenship in Africa. It seeks to offset the neglect of mass politics in the recent literature on African politics by posing a set of interrelated research questions. How do ordinary Africans view competitive elections? How do they behave at election time? In particular, do they vote for incumbents or opposition? What motivates their vote choice? How do people react to electoral malpractice? How do they participate in politics between elections? What are the implications of new forms of participation for democratic citizenship? And what are the implications of competitive elections for democracy?
In the past, it was difficult to offer convincing answers to any of these questions. Not only were elections uncompetitive in one-party and military regimes, but few other prospects were available to ordinary Africans for meaningful political participation. Moreover, data on voting and citizenship were often unreliable because official turnout rates or presidential victory margins were manufactured to favor incumbents. And the content of public opinion remained unknown because entrenched authoritarian rulers forbade national probability sample surveys on mass political attitudes and behavior.
In the absence of systematic empirical evidence, analysts had little choice but to make inferences about voting patterns, popular participation, and citizen preferences from small sets of qualitative interviews or narrowly drawn case studies.
The Afrobarometer has created opportunities for a much more rigorous research agenda. The Afrobarometer is a cross-national survey research project that measures a country's social, economic, and political atmosphere as seen by a representative sample of its adult population. Launched in 1999 as a response to a liberalizing political environment on the African continent, the project had conducted five rounds of surveys by 2012. The resulting Afrobarometer database contains well over 100,000 interviews with everyday people on subjects ranging from democracy and governance to social identity and economic well-being.
This volume assembles between two covers a selection of analyses on voting and citizenship by scholars who have made use of this unique empirical resource. As such, Voting and Democratic Citizenship in Africa represents the culmination of a focused and collective research effort by scholars on several continents over the course of at least a decade. It aims to move discussion of these topics forward by granting long-overdue attention to the attitudes and behaviors of ordinary people.
Approach
When analysts focus at the macro level, they are inclined to study large structures and whole systems. The literature on democratization, for example, tends to devote attention to relationships between national political institutions and political regimes writ large. For example, considerable ink has been spilled debating the exact nature of the relationship between elections and democracy. Most analysts take to heart Terry Karl's (1986) warning about "the electoral fallacy," namely that elections alone-however free and fair they may be-do not a democracy make (see also Diamond and Plattner 2010; Birch 2011) . Instead, other institutions such as a constitutional rule of law, an independent legislature and judiciary, civilian control of the military, and a functioning civil society (including free mass media) are deemed also to be necessary. Indeed, policymakers and practitioners now commonly see the challenge of democracy building-not to mention economic development-in terms of "getting the institutions right" (Rodrik 2004; Bjornlund 2004; Carothers 2006; USAID 2010) .
I do not deny the formative influence of a polity's institutional framework on regime outcomes. Nor do I question the centrality of the rule of law to the consolidation of democracy. But political institutions are more than formal-legal structures. They only come alive when political actors An Overview breathe life into them. We need to know what people actually think and do when they inhabit political roles and embrace political rules-in short, when they make institutions their own. Do they attach political value to constitutional norms and allow institutional routines to regulate and shape their behavior? In turn, do they express opinions and exert influences that endow political institutions with indigenous legitimacy? In my opinion, political institutions and political culture tend to coevolve, with the most legitimate institutions being those to which the largest numbers of people voluntarily grant consent. For this reason alone, any account of regime consolidation must attend to the micropolitics of individual attitudes and behavior.
This book puts the spotlight on micropolitics. The unit of analysis in all the chapters that follow is the individual, whether as voter or citizen. A distinction is drawn between voting behavior and democratic citizenship, though each complements the other. Voting behavior is a set of personal electoral activities, including participation in electoral campaigns, turnout at the polls, and choosing for whom to vote. Democratic citizenship is defined here as participation in popular collective action and engagement with political leaders and institutions, including between elections and within a rule of law. This broad notion of citizenship goes well beyond the formal attributes of legal citizenship-such as birth, marriage, or naturalization-that entitle an individual to hold a passport or national identity card. Rather, it refers to a political understanding of citizenship based on civic engagement and participation. It is consistent with the contrasts made in the literature between citizens, on the one hand, and "parochials" (who are disengaged from the political system) and "subjects" (who passively defer to authority) on the other (Almond and Verba 1963; Mamdani 1996) . Citizens are also distinguished from "clients," understood as those who simply seek patronage rather than a role in political decisionmaking (Fox 1994; Bratton 2008) .
The authors of the chapters that follow employ Afrobarometer survey data to measure both voting behavior and democratic citizenship. They make reference to individuals' turnout at the polls, choice of election candidates, mass engagement with political institutions, and popular affect for political regimes. By viewing politics from below, the aim is to draw a much more complete picture of the range of actors (common as well as elite) who shape political institutions. And by bringing considerations of mass political culture into the picture-usually by means of cross-national analysis-the goal is to improve understanding of the conditions under which political regimes (whether democratic, hybrid, or authoritarian) survive and consolidate.
Take the foundational issue of the connection between elections and democracy. Operating from a holistic perspective, most analysts would probably agree that elections are the sine qua non of democracy, but not its be-all and end-all. One can certainly find empirical cases of elections in the absence of democracy (see Chapter 2). But the converse is not true: one never finds democracy without elections. Stated succinctly, elections are a necessary condition for democracy, even if not a sufficient one.
But does this relationship hold at the micro level as well as at the macro level? In determining whether people regard elections as essential to democracy, we need in the first instance to know whether ordinary people value electoral institutions. And we must ascertain whether they connect their evaluations of the quality of elections to judgments about the establishment of democracy. Also, we must study whether popular electoral behavior reinforces any such cultural attachment. Finally, we would be interested to know whether individuals follow through after elections to supplement voting with autonomous efforts to seek responsiveness, representation, and accountability from political leaders.
After all, there may be a micro-level analog to the macro-level "electoral fallacy." One might think of it as the "voting fallacy." In this construct, people may minimally meet the necessary condition of turning out at the polls and casting a ballot. But they may also fail to fulfill the much more demanding requirements of active citizenship during the long periods between elections. As a working hypothesis, one should expect that, just as elections do not a democracy make, so voting does not a citizen make. On its own, the act of voting may not be enough to create democratic political orientations or stimulate a full range of democratic behaviors. Rather, other values, attitudes, and activities are required for voters to become wellrounded and effective participants in a democratic regime. Together, these attributes amount to the sufficient condition for citizenship.
The prevailing institutional framework for African politics obviously poses formidable barriers to active citizenship. Many residents of sub-Saharan countries-especially the poor-are citizens in name only, since they enjoy few meaningful channels of political participation. Elections tend to be contests between corrupt and clientelistic elites who stand ready to resort to vote buying, even violence. Far from providing a two-way linkage between citizens and the political center, African political parties are usually personalistic, elite-dominated, and internally undemocratic. As a result, elections often produce national assemblies and local governments that remain unrepresentative of broad-based constituencies and unresponsive to popular demands.
Moreover, shortcomings in democratic development may emanate from the individual level as well as the institutional level. One would expect, for example, that if people in Africa vote reflexively along lines of ethnic identity, then they forego opportunities to appraise incumbent governments on the basis of policy performance. Or, if voters tend to sell their votes to the highest bidder, then it is questionable whether they have a full appreciation of citizen rights and obligations. Alternatively, if individuals are partly responsible An Overview for a "representation gap" between themselves and their elected representatives, then they are unable to participate fully in the democratic policy process. In sum, if people in Africa are voters but not citizens (see Chapter 11), or if they are "uncritical" citizens (see Chapters 9 and 12), then one would expect negative consequences for the consolidation of democracy.
Method
Since the Afrobarometer provides the empirical foundation for this book, a brief review of the project's main organizational features and research protocols is in order. By summarizing this material here, it becomes possible to reduce the amount of methodological justification offered in each chapter. In describing the Afrobarometer method, I make explicit a few technical caveats.
The Afrobarometer is an independent, nonpartisan, social science research project. It is dedicated to three main objectives: to produce scientifically reliable data on public opinion in Africa; to strengthen capacity for survey research in African institutions; and to broadly disseminate and apply survey results. Because of its ambitious scope, the project is organized as an African-led international collaboration. The Afrobarometer Network is managed by core partner institutions: the Center for Democratic Development in Ghana, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa, the Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy in Benin, and, as of 2011, the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi in Kenya. Analytic and support services are provided by the University of Cape Town and Michigan State University. The network also includes national partner institutions-such as university-based research groups, independent think tanks, and private polling firms-that conduct surveys and compile raw results in each participating country.
Surveys are conducted in multiple countries-starting with twelve in 1999 and growing to more than thirty in 2012-and are repeated on a regular cycle. Five rounds of surveys had been completed or were under way at the time of writing. The thrust of the Afrobarometer questionnaire concerns democracy and governance. What do ordinary people think about a democratic form of government and alternative regimes? And to what extent do they participate in decisionmaking and policy implementation? Because the instrument asks a standard set of questions, countries can be systematically compared and trends in attitudes and behaviors can be tracked over time. Each round of surveys also includes an in-depth, specialized module on a selected subject like ethnic identity, economic reform, political leadership, local government, or the use of information and communication technology. This book draws mainly on the Round 3 Afrobarometer survey, conducted in eighteen countries in 2005, which features the project's most comprehensive data module on elections, voting behavior, and political participation between elections.
A multinational committee from within the Afrobarometer Network develops the questionnaire for each round of surveys. The items in the instrument are indigenized to reflect local institutional nomenclature, translated into major native languages, and then blindly translated back into the original national language. Refinements to ensure consistency in question wording are made at every stage. Within each country, interviewers are trained to administer the questionnaire in a weeklong preparatory program that involves interview simulations and field tests. Once deployed to the field, teams of four interviewers travel together to selected research sites and are constantly monitored by survey supervisors. It is the interviewers' job to seek each respondent's informed consent to participate in the survey, to administer the questions in the language of the respondent's choice, and to record responses, usually by selecting a precoded numerical score. On occasion, interviewers also record open-ended verbatim statements in the respondent's own words. Supervisors make follow-up visits to randomly selected households as well as checking every completed survey before teams leave the field.
In each country, the Afrobarometer covers a representative sample of the adult population-that is, those who are over eighteen years old and eligible to vote. Individuals are selected using a multistage, stratified, clustered area design that is randomized at every stage. The stratification ensures that all main administrative regions (and cultural groups) are included in the sample and that urban and rural populations are represented in correct relative proportions. The latest national census, updated with projections where necessary, is used as a sampling frame to randomly choose primary sampling units with probability proportional to population size. If household lists are unavailable within the primary sampling units, which is often the case, then households are selected using a random walk pattern from geographical start points chosen by chance. Within the household, respondents are picked by a blind drawing of names from a list of household members, but with the proviso that interviews are alternated between men and women. This multistage sampling design produces not only equal numbers by gender but also a cross-section of the eligible electorate.
The target sample size for any survey in any country is a minimum of 1,200 respondents. For descriptive statistics, this sample size is sufficient to yield a confidence interval of plus or minus 3 percentage points (actually 2.8 percentage points) at a confidence level of 95 percent. In countries that are especially culturally diverse, a larger sample size of 2,400 respondents is employed, the better to reduce sampling error and to allow enough cases to enable generalization about minority subpopulations. If minorities are purposely oversampled within a country (like Coloureds and Indians in South Africa, or Delta-region ethnic groups in Nigeria), then data are corrected by weights. Similarly, when data are pooled across countries, an additional weight is applied to standardize all countries at the same sample size (n = 1,200) regardless of total population. Frequency distributions record proportions of valid responses (including "don't know") and are rounded to the nearest whole percentage point. Readers should bear these rounding rules, confidence intervals, and weighting effects in mind when interpreting particular data points.
Special care is required when making inferences from aggregate crossnational statistics that purport to represent an Afrobarometer "mean." For one reason, average scores can be misleading because they smooth out and cover up some of the most interesting variations between countries and among individuals. In addition, it is essential to note that, while the countries included in Afrobarometer surveys do not differ significantly from sub-Saharan averages on selected socioeconomic indicators, they are not fully representative of Africa as a whole. Having undergone a measure of political and economic reform, they are among the continent's most open regimes. However, the inclusion of countries with past or present internal conflicts-like Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zimbabwehelps to make the country sample more representative of the subcontinent. But considerable caution is nonetheless warranted when projecting Afrobarometer results to all "Africans."
Many of the analyses that follow reflect a growing methodological sophistication in the comparative analysis of African politics. Most of the authors of this volume employ regression analysis, usually based on Round 3 data pooled across eighteen countries (n = 21,351). For purposes of inferential statistics, weights are always turned off. In some chapters, authors employ multiple-imputation software to infer values for missing cases; in other chapters, they drop those cases from analysis. Where the possible effects of these alternate data management methods are explicitly tested, results remain robust (e.g., Chapter 5). Several chapters focus on political objects of interest that have a discontinuous, binary form: voters either turn out at the polls or they do not; they vote for the incumbent or they do not. Accordingly, authors choose forms of regression (logit or probit) that are suited to analyzing dependent variables of this kind (e.g., Chapters 3 and 6). Moreover, several authors acknowledge the nested structure of Afrobarometer data in which cases are clustered rather than independent, for example within the distinctive settings of particular countries. To address these systematic patterns, they opt to supplement the Afrobarometer with national-level data from independent sources and to apply multilevel hierarchical regression techniques (e.g., Chapters 4, 5, and 10).
Methodological rigor brings both advantages and disadvantages. While strict adherence to statistical procedures can increase confidence in research outcomes, too much attention to method can obscure the substance-and thus diminish the interest and importance-of results. I have tried to strike a happy medium in this book. In order to focus on tangible outcomes, to allow access for the general reader, and to keep the book to manageable length, I have edited out some of the supporting technical matter that usually appears in journal articles in the scientific literature. Wherever possible, detailed methodological discussions and technical footnotes have been removed. Readers who wish information on the nuts and bolts of survey and statistical analyses may visit the Afrobarometer website (www.afro barometer.org), consult unedited versions of those papers previously published in scientific journals, or contact the authors directly.
One last point. How valid and reliable are the subjective views of ordinary citizens? On a continent where most people live in rural areas and where a good education is hard to find, individuals may not be well enough informed to offer dependable opinions. Or so goes the argument. While education clearly improves a respondent's comprehension of survey questions and adds sophistication to answers, my colleagues and I nevertheless resist concluding that nonliterate or locally oriented respondents lack the capacity to form opinions. On the contrary, we have found that, as long as questions are stated plainly and concretely (question wordings are provided in the text and tables that follow), Africans can express clear opinions on subjects like voting behavior, electoral choice, and political authority.
Indeed, I would argue that in the realm of politics, perceptions matter just as much-if not more-than reality. That which people think to be trueincluding judgments about the quality of elections and the perfor-mance of regimes-is a central motivation for behavior. Perceptions are paramount, not only in the interest-driven realm of the marketplace, but also in the ideological realm of politics. Whether or not attitudes exactly mirror exterior circumstances, an individual's interior perspective forms the basis of any bottom-up calculus for action. And, consistent with my instinct that all people, whatever their material circumstances, are capable of acute observation and rational thought, the contributors to this book find that public opinion is not only a useful predictor of mass political behavior, but also an essential element in the consolidation of political institutions and regimes.
Results
This book describes and analyzes voting and interelectoral behavior across a range of Africa's new democratic regimes. And it evaluates the contributions of individual citizens, and the limitations they face, in contributing to the consolidation of democracy. Among the main results are the following:
An Overview
• In all countries selected for study, Africans consider elections as the best means of forming a government, and they judge the quality of democracy accordingly.
• When choosing candidates in elections, African voters are motivated by social identity, but they also consider partisan loyalty and especially economic performance.
• Vote buying appears to increase voter turnout, but violence depresses it.
• When deciding how to cast a vote, Africans are usually able to sidestep unwanted inducements and pressures (like vote buying and violence) and to vote mainly according to their own preferences.
• In certain countries, many Africans display uncritical citizenship as characterized by low levels of political knowledge and unreflective political evaluations.
• After elections, voters in many African countries commonly fail to demand vertical accountability; they do not always see themselves as responsible for holding leaders in check.
• Free and fair elections build popular demand for democracy, but more so among election "losers" than election "winners." • High-quality elections give citizens confidence that abuse of public office will be reined in (control of corruption) and that official policy directives ought to be obeyed (legitimacy of the state).
Outline of the Book
Expanding on the themes of this introduction, Chapter 2 asks, Where do elections lead in Africa? At issue is whether competitive voting contests help to foster democracy or whether they serve as a smokescreen for the persistence of authoritarian forms of government. I examine this foundational issue with reference to recent theoretical debates and to sources of both macro-and micro-level data. The evidence from both levels strongly suggests that regime outcomes depend on the quality of elections: only free and fair contests foster democratization, whereas elections on an unlevel playing field are an institutional recipe for disguised autocracy. Moreover, only in Africa's more open societies do citizens react against poor-quality elections by organizing collectively to demand greater accountability. Thereafter, the volume is divided into five parts. Part 1 deals with vote choice. Whom do Africans vote for and why? In Chapter 3, Pippa Norris and Robert Mattes ask whether Africans vote along ethnic lines. Their seminal, ground-clearing analysis finds evidence to both confirm and undermine this commonplace assumption. On one hand, they report that ethnicgroup membership is a significant predictor of partisan attachments in most of Africa's plural societies. On the other hand, the observed ethnic effect on party preferences is relatively small, does not always accrue to the advantage of sitting leaders, and is sometimes eclipsed by popular evaluations of incumbent performance. In other words, ethnic identity seems to matter to voting in Africa, but only as part of a more complex set of considerations that includes citizens' instrumental appraisals of the track record of the party in government. Following Norris and Mattes, analysts have since concluded that voting behavior must be modeled in multivariate terms and that election outcomes can no longer be reduced to a simple "ethnic census."
In Chapter 4, Benn Eifert, Edward Miguel, and Daniel Posner reverse the causal arrow. They investigate whether exposure to political competition during elections inclines voters to identify in ethnic terms. They show that "close" elections, which combine proximity in time with a tight race, are associated with an increase in the salience of ethnicity. While voters are not innately predisposed to identify in ethnic terms-in fact, more Africans self-define in occupational or other terms-they incline toward ethnic reasoning in the heat of approaching political contests. This original insight is consistent with both a theory of political entrepreneurship in which politicians play an "ethnic card" in order to mobilize support and a theory of political motivation in which voters seek to associate themselves with candidates deemed likely to distribute patronage. Most important, these authors provide evidence that modern ethnic identities in Africa are fluid, situational, and constructed, including from an explicitly political source: competitive elections.
In Chapter 5, my colleagues Ravi Bhavnani and Tse-Hsin Chen and I offer a comprehensive account of popular voting intentions. In an effort to arbitrate a debate between advocates of ethnic and economic voting, we show that competitive elections in Africa are more than mere ethnic censuses or simple economic referenda. Instead, Africans engage in both ethnic and economic voting. Not surprisingly, people who belong to the ethnic group in power intend to support the ruling party, in contrast to those who feel a sense of discrimination against their cultural group. But, to an even greater extent, would-be voters in Africa consider policy performance, especially the government's perceived handling of unemployment, inflation, and income distribution. We reconcile the coexistence of different types of voting by suggesting that ethnic voting is rooted in an economic logic. Moreover, a full account of the intention to vote in Africa also requires recognition that citizens are motivated-sincerely or strategically-by partisan considerations; they vote for established ruling parties because they expect that incumbents will win. We show that voters attempt to associate themselves with prospective winners because they wish to gain access to patronage benefits and to avoid retribution after the election. These dynamics are most evident in African countries where dominant parties restrict the range of electoral choice.
Part 2 of the book deals with electoral malpractices, particularly the influence of political money. What effects, if any, does vote buying have on voter turnout and partisan choice? In Chapter 6, Eric Kramon studies the relationship between an individual's exposure to material inducements and his or her subsequent turnout at the polls during an election in Kenya. He finds that vote buying, which politicians target disproportionately at people without formal education, has a discernible positive effect on voter turnout. This effect is especially pronounced in districts where elections are closely fought and where outcomes are most uncertain. In seeking to explain the link between vote buying and voter turnout, Kramon finds suggestive evidence for at least two mechanisms, both expressed in terms of citizen perceptions. First, vote buying "works" best among citizens who believe that political parties are capable of monitoring turnout at the polls and punishing those who abstain from voting. And second, vote buying induces participation among clients who regard it as a signal of a patron's credibility to keep campaign promises once the election is over.
Vote buying and violence in election campaigns in Nigeria are the subject of Chapter 7. I report that both sorts of malpractice were important, if epiphenomenal, dimensions of a 2007 national election campaign. According to survey-based estimates, fewer than one out of five Nigerians was personally exposed to vote buying and fewer than one in ten experienced threats of electoral violence. But when, as commonly happens, campaign irregularities are targeted at the rural poor, effects are concentrated: violence reduces turnout, and vote buying enhances partisan loyalty. But, perhaps because most citizens condemn campaign manipulation as wrong, compliance with the wishes of politicians is not ensured. Defection from threats and agreements is more common than compliance, especially where voters are cross-pressured from both sides of the partisan divide.
Chapter 8 turns from Nigeria to Uganda. Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz and Carolyn Logan delve in depth into the determinants of incumbent Yoweri Museveni's victory in the 2011 presidential election. The authors question a conventional storyline that attributes the election outcome to the power of political money-that is, that the incumbent bought the election through massive spending. They demonstrate that Ugandans who were exposed to vote buying, or who benefited from political goods distribution and the creation of new rural districts, were hardly more likely than their fellow citizens to vote for the incumbent. Instead, the authors trace Museveni's electoral success to an uninspiring slate of opposition candidates, a growing economy, and an improved security situation, particularly in the northern part of the country. In so doing, the authors perform a useful service in situating vote buying and related inducements in a broader context of policy performance.
Part 3 examines the aftermath of voting. Do voters become democratic citizens in the sense of seeking to hold political leaders accountable between elections? In Chapter 9, Robert Mattes and Carlos Shenga introduce the concept of "uncritical citizenship." In the context of Mozambique, high levels of poverty along with underdeveloped infrastructure greatly inhibit citizens' ability to participate in politics. Moreover, low rates of formal education, high levels of illiteracy, and limited access to news media reduce the flow of political information that would allow citizens to develop informed opinions. Many Mozambicans are unable to answer questions pertaining to the performance of government or to offer preferences about what kind of regime Mozambique ought to have. And those who are able to offer answers often uncritically overrate regime performance. Perhaps because of high levels of popular satisfaction with the supply of democracy, Mozambicans express low levels of demand for the further deepening of democracy. The authors argue that this sort of "uncritical citizenship" is a function of living in a "low-information society." Wonbin Cho's contribution in Chapter 10 draws an important distinction about the perceived functions of competitive elections: Are these institutions seen to produce accountability or representation? As measured in the Afrobarometer, the former refers to leadership turnover at the polls, the latter to leadership responsiveness in office. Utilizing this distinction, the author traces citizen confidence in legislative institutions to the nature of electoral systems under which African legislatures are chosen. Majoritarian electoral systems promote a sense of citizen control over policymakers (that is, accountability), whereas proportional representation systems increase the perception of inclusion across a society's factions (that is, representation). Because sub-Saharan African citizens typically prioritize representation rather than accountability when evaluating their legislative institutions, proportional representation systems are found to have an advantage in boosting public trust in political institutions in the region.
In Chapter 11, my colleague Carolyn Logan and I ask why multiparty elections have so far failed to secure greater political accountability. One answer concerns how Africans themselves understand the contours of new political regimes and, in particular, their own roles in a democracy. Afrobarometer respondents do not believe that elections have been particularly effective at securing political accountability. And when it comes to asserting control over elected leaders in the long intervals between elections, a substantial number of Africans do not see any role for themselves. Even while becoming active voters, they do not appear to assert political rights as citizens, notably to regularly demand accountability from leaders. As such, most African political regimes have yet to meet the minimum requirements of participatory democracy and instead share characteristics with Latin America's "delegative" democracies. But the problem for many new de mocracies in Africa is not so much that citizens knowingly delegate authority to strong presidents, but that democracy remains unclaimed by mere voters.
In Part 4, the scope of the analysis widens to consider the effects of voting and citizenship on prospects for democratic development. In Chapter 12, Devra Moehler examines the consequences of elections for popular perceptions of political legitimacy. She finds that, in multiparty regimes in subSaharan Africa, where elections are often imperfect, supporters of losing political parties express much less support for political institutions than do winners. The so-called losers-who tend to judge the quality of elections more harshly than do the winners-are less inclined to trust national political institutions, to consent voluntarily to the commands of the governing authority, and to feel that voting matters. Contrary to initial expectations, however, losers are more willing than winners to defend democracy against official manipulation. Losers are critical of prevailing proto-democratic institutions, but nonetheless are willing to protect them. By contrast, winners tend to be submissive subjects, granting unconditional support to current leaders. Finally, Moehler notes that divergent evaluations of electoral fairness are responsible for only a small portion of winner-loser gaps in legitimacy. Losers are much more likely than winners to denounce flawed elections, but losers have additional reasons to doubt the legitimacy of the current structure of political institutions.
Chapter 13 returns to a question first raised in Chapter 2: Does the quality of elections matter for the subsequent consolidation of democracy? Ari Greenberg and Robert Mattes provide additional statistical evidence for an answer in the positive. They show, first, that international election observers and ordinary Africans are in general agreement about the quality of particular electoral contests in Africa. In places and times where elections are deemed free, people subsequently judge that political elites are supplying democracy. But wherever elections are flawed, people tend to conclude that democracy is not being delivered. To tease out the causality in this relationship, the authors compare free and flawed elections that occur between rounds of Afrobarometer surveys, tracing impacts on changes in public opinion. Accordingly, they make a case that the relationship between election quality and the supply of democracy is a causal one, with the former shaping the latter. Finally, they note that, while election quality shapes perceptions of the supply of democracy, it has little influence on popular demand for democracy. One possible reason is that flawed elections encourage democrats in the general populace to redouble their commitments to installing or reinstating their preferred political regime.
Chapter 14 peers further into the future. Using macro-level, microlevel, and trend data, it asks: Does democratization lead to improved governance? I find an elective affinity between free elections, democracy, and improved governance, at least as these concepts are seen and understood by ordinary Africans. But the democracy advantage is more apparent in relation to some dimensions of public governance than others. For example, while Africans apparently think that elections boost the rule of law and control of corruption, they also seem to worry that democracy undercuts the transparency of government procedures and the responsiveness of elected officials. To address the debate on causality, I compare governance performance before and after electoral alternations, finding a positive effect. Accordingly, I conclude that-as a rule of thumb for policy sequencingdemocracy promotion need not await the prior establishment of rule of law.
Finally, in Part 5 in Chapter 15, building on the collective enterprise contained within these pages, I conclude the book with a few reflections on lessons learned about mass political behavior and propose an agenda for future research on voting and democratic citizenship.
